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INTRODUCTION   
Much has been said about the EU’s general response to the Arab spring. And much has been written 
about regimes’ resistance to the far-reaching reform demanded by protestors across the Arab world. 
We have been engaged in a project (www.euspring.com) exploring one very specific dimension of 
these political trends and social debates: the question of how citizens in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) understand the concept of democratic citizen-ship.  
Within our project, our local affiliated research organizations ran throughout 2014 a series of focus 
groups in Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia with a range of civic stakeholders. The aim of these meetings 
was to explore how citizens in the three countries understand democratic citizenship and how they 
view EU efforts to support political reform. 
Under the rubric of its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) review, the EU has promised to adjust 
its policies better to listen to citizens in the neighbourhood. There is broad agreement that the EU 
needs to make greater effort to fit its support around the priorities identified by local civil society 
organizations. This in turn raises a broader question of what Arab reformers themselves understand 
by democratic citizenship. Our project sheds light on the nature of these ‘local’ views – on the issue 
of democratic citizenship and on the kind of sup-port that Arab reformers seek from the EU and 
member states. 
REMAINS OF SPRING  
While the Arab spring has not resulted in a democratic wave across the MENA region, it has opened 
up public discussion and generated new debates about citizenship. Despite the failure or atrophy of 
many reform projects (our purpose here is not a general explanation for this), the burst of civic 
energy in 2011 and 2012 appears to have left a legacy: the possibility for citizens to engage more 
openly in public debates about their conceptions of democracy and citizenship and what kind of 
rights they aspire to.  
Political developments in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt have been very different. Yet all three 
countries have experienced extremely lively and complex debates about democracy, citizenship and 
how to enshrine a new set of rights in their constitutions. The paradox is that events since 2011 have 
proven Arab states to be weak, but also that citizens believe their rights vis a vis the state to be 
insufficiently robust. 
Tunisia’s political life and society have been divided by deep differences between secularism and 
Islam. Yet Tunisia’s different parties and social actors were able to reach compromises to underpin 
agreement over a new constitution. They ensured that the constitutional process was inclusive and 
participatory, as different understandings of citizenship and rights were argued out in pluralistic 
fashion.  
The new 2014 constitution represents a huge step forward for Tunisian society. Political rights are 
fully embraced and codified; socio-economic rights are recognised; and women’s rights are probably 
the most advanced in the Arab world. There are ambiguities in the text especially regarding the 
relationship between individual freedoms and religion, on the one hand, and the role of the state in 
safeguarding Islam, on the other hand. These ambiguities reflect the difficulties of reaching 
compromises between secular and religious forces. 
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On socio-economic rights in particular, Tunisia’s constitution does not clearly define the role of the 
state in guaranteeing socio-economic rights through welfare provisions, labour laws, private and 
public property. The constitution leaves the boundaries between constitutional rights and policy 
choices somewhat blurred. Minority rights are not fully protected. While individual freedoms are 
enshrined, including the right to belief, religious and ethnic minorities are not recognised as a group.  
Egypt’s journey through revolution, Muslim Brotherhood rule and back to a military regime is well 
known. In this back and forth process, debates over rights and citizenship have been prominent. The 
Muslim Brotherhood government produced a draft constitution that in some respects was a step 
backward in terms of political rights and freedoms. After the army ejected president Mohamed Morsi 
from power, an appointed assembly led a new constitutional process. There was little or no 
consultation with other political forces and no involvement of external advisors. The resulting 
constitution gives stronger protection to some personal rights than the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
document; but politically it has legitimized a much less democratic form of politics.  
Morocco has not advanced towards democracy but its new constitution of March 2011 does offer 
enhanced protection for some personal rights. Moroccan civil society now focuses on ‘effective 
citizenship’ – the implementation in practice of the rights enshrined in the constitution. Civil society 
in Morocco has pressed for stronger personal rights. However, of the three countries considered here, 
Moroccan civil society is probably the least confrontational towards the state. Many Moroccans seem 
to understand citizenship to be about state and society working together (even where the state is not 
fully democratic) rather than primarily or only being about holding the state in check.  
ARAB VIEWS OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP  
In Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt the EU and several member states have undertaken numerous 
initiatives to mediate in constitutional reform discussions; sponsor forums examining Islamic 
concepts of rights; and generate inclusive civil society channels of influence. The EU has 
occasionally exerted pressure against restrictive rights provisions, as it did in the early stages of 
Tunisia’s constitutional process. The EU Delegation in Tunis also offered technical advice on the 
constitutional process. In Egypt, the EU appeared to extol the virtues of some rights-protecting 
articles in the army’s constitution, despite the overall drift away from democracy. Yet most of the 
Union’s projects related in some way to liberal democratic rights have ground to a halt in Egypt, 
including those on women’s rights and freedom of expression and association. Of course, it is well 
known that the EU has struggled to pushback against Egypt’s return to autocracy and has long been 
reluctant critically to push the Moroccan palace into a more far-reaching political opening.  
 
We have previously assessed the EU’s general response to the Arab spring. What interests us in this 
current article is how local actors in the three countries relate their own debates specifically over 
democratic citizenship to EU policies. 
 
Civil society and political party representatives generally acknowledge that the EU has tried to 
foment open debate about democratic citizenship. However, in our focus groups they also brought 
out criticisms of EU policies and argued strongly that the Union urgently needs to develop its 
efforts in a number of crucial directions: 
 
Citizens in the three countries tend to associate citizenship and rights with new forms of politics 
that revolve around individuals rather than pre-existing institutional channels. So, for example, they 
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seek outside support to organize campaigns under which citizens are able to present legislative 
proposals directly to be included in the parliamentary agenda. Civic leaders see such campaigns as 
being especially important to circumvent dysfunctional and self-serving political parties. Parties 
have disengaged from social movements; and youth has disengaged from political party activity. In 
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt social actors believe that European donors have not yet registered the 
scale of this change. 
 
There is a shared concern that political participation needs re-energizing. Participation increased 
after 2011 but citizens’ groups have since become disillusioned – especially in Egypt, and in 
Morocco more than Tunisia. Western debates tend to imply the region’s politics is all about the 
divide between Islamists and secularists. But our groups insisted the breach is more between 
citizens and entrenched elites, and is thus not entirely dissimilar to the driving force in European 
politics today.  
 
The 2011 uprisings were about participatory politics, but many feel that this focus was hijacked by 
debates over very formalistic notions of rights. The MB sought to align itself with the deep state 
and as part of a counter-revolutionary project; this dried up the focus on civic rights and 
participation. Analysts talked of the rise of illiberal democracy: political competition with weak 
rights protection. However, Egypt today has negligible democracy, but a constitution with more 
liberal rights provisions than the previous constitution. Citizens still want basic political rights to be 
protected. Yet the prevailing attitude now is apathy and distrust in any political alternative. A so-
called ‘silent majority’ waits patiently in Egypt; its expectations in terms of active citizenship have 
evolved but the practical ability to put these into practice is now more limited even than under 
Hosni Mubarak.  
 
In Egypt and Morocco our groups expressed some unease over the EU’s provision of advice and 
advisors in constitutional processes that legitimise incumbent regimes. This outside advice tends to 
focus on very legalistic rights provisions that do not resonate with every day political norms. The 
drafters of new constitutions can often be rather undemocratic insiders - and outside consultants fail 
to capture the real political dynamics beyond whatever formal provisions are included in a new 
constitution. Formal rights under the current constitutions in Egypt and Morocco may have taken 
some steps forward, but in practice authoritarianism is now more firmly embedded in both 
countries. 
 
The EU needs to work more on media freedom and its role in fostering democratic citizenship. 
Especially in Morocco and Egypt the rights of journalists have contracted dramatically; the situation 
under the current government in Tunisia also gives rise to some concerns. This has implications for 
the way in which external actors carry out media training. As media freedoms have tightened, 
external actors cannot simply offer generic training courses and then claim they are effectively 
promoting the right to freedom of information.  
 
Re-engaging with Islamists in Egypt and making sure Islamists are not incrementally pushed aside 
in Morocco and Tunisia. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood is undergoing considerable internal 
change, with a turnover in personnel and a restructuring of decision-making processes. Islamists 
have not moved back to violence but rather a kind of passive resistance – there is more talk of 
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withdrawal, non-participation, and various forms of boycott against the current political system. 
Salafist groups are losing supporters due to their accommodation with the regime. This is a pivotal 
moment for exerting influence over the future direction of Islamist parties in the three countries. 
 
External actors like the EU can help through a focus on tolerance initiatives. Participants in our 
focus groups felt that tolerance initiatives were needed to accompany any advance in democratic 
rights; without tolerance those rights are likely to widen societal divisions. Democratic rights and 
citizenship needs to be framed more in terms of mutual tolerance. There is growing use of hate 
speech from all parts of the political spectrum – counteracting this should be more of a priority 
within EU support. One of the main challenges is how to limit hate speech without restricting 
freedom of speech; this is where the region desperately needs help and ideas. A key finding of our 
project is that advances in formal citizenship rights cannot be divorced from the deeper cultural 
norms that affect the way these rights are exercised.  
 
State-society linkages are vital. Many members of prominent social movements in the three 
countries admit that their error was not to seek pro-reform allies within state institutions on the 
grounds that all such bodies were intrinsically part of regimes. They acknowledge that they often 
adopted overly confrontational tactics and scared many with relatively liberal views back into the 
arms of regime defenders. Unwittingly, the same mobilizations that pushed for democracy worked 
against liberal notions of rights.  
 
Discrimination in rights is a product of a broader absence of pluralism as a social norm. People 
press for the principles of freedom (of expression, association etc) when their own interests are 
threatened but not as general principles desirable also to protect opposing viewpoints. Minority 
rights – for example, for Jewish and Amazigh communities – are not well understood. Women’s 
rights have improved but still need to go beyond legal changes to practical improvements on the 
ground, especially in rural areas. To reiterate: cultural change is needed in parallel to formal 
constitutional change.  
 
The relationship between state and religion - and the degree of state interference in matters of faith - 
remains ambiguous in the three countries. The debates that occurred during the respective 
constitutional processes showed that this relationship will be of defining importance for the 
deepening of democratic rights. However, the three countries’ varied reform processes have all 
failed so far to produce clear definitions of the boundaries between state responsibility and 
individual rights. External actors may have provided support for initiatives on a select number of 
particular rights, but have not got to grips with this core uncertainty.  
 
European donors do not do enough to get projects promoting liberal rights out into the countryside. 
In Tunisia and Egypt Islamist support is highest in the countryside, where there are often no other 
candidates reaching out to citizens. It is in these areas that there continues to be most ambivalence 
over the concept of liberal, personal rights provisions and least support for notions of active 
democratic citizenship. In Morocco the countryside vote prizes notables tied to the king’s party. In 
all cases EU aid continues to be concentrated on national capitals and urban cities, with insufficient 
presence in rural areas. Despite all the potential of the Arab spring and despite the recognition on 
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part of EU officials of their insufficient outreach in the countryside, local actors feel that donors 
have not responded by augmenting the geographical spread of their projects.  
    
CONCLUSIONS: THE EU’S ROLE  
In Tunisia the EU has been a factor in supporting the country’s transformation so far. Over-all, it 
has maintained a commitment towards the country’s transition reflected in continuing its policies 
and upholding consistent political positions. In the field, the EU Delegation has provided technical 
assistance and expertise on constitutional reform, linked up with civil society representatives, and 
selected Tunisia as one of the pilot countries for its democracy support projects. In Egypt EU policy 
as a whole has gone full circle, reverting eventually to pre-Arab Spring positions. Despite a number 
of high-level initiatives, in Egypt the EU did not manage to gain traction with any post-Mubarak 
government, nor was it able to sustain the initial support it gave to civil society groups and 
movements after the revolution. In Morocco, the EU has sought to be a partner in the regime-led 
process of modest change, with less of a bottom-up focus on citizen initiatives than in Tunisia or 
Egypt.  
EU institutions clearly have much knowhow and wherewithal to help processes of democratic 
change – but our project reveals how much more needs to be done to tailor these to local 
specificities. Domestic and international circumstances were more favourable to nuancing EU 
engagement in Tunisia, but the experience there shows that there are options for more targeted 
initiatives on the ground, relevant to local discussions and needs. The EU needs to focus far more 
on building policies in the field and connecting with local dynamics to support democracy change.  
This requires greater involvement of EU Delegations not just in implementing projects, but also in 
shaping the ways and means in which the EU makes itself relevant in local debates. The EU also 
needs to become more flexible in its understanding of democratic citizenship and better engage with 
local perceptions on this bedrock of political change. Finally, fine-tuning and dovetailing local 
engagement with diplomacy and broader policy choices re-mains a challenge: the EU as a whole 
needs to invest more seriously in learning through its experiences locally and in shaping its broader 
foreign policy goals more coherently. 
